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Abstract 
 
Why does the European Union (EU)  join international human rights treaties?  This 
paper develops  motivational profiles pertaining either  to  a  ‘logic of appropriate-
ness’ or a ‘logic of consequentialism’ in order to answer this question. It compares 
the EU’s motivations for its recent accession to the United Nations Convention on the 
Rights of Persons with Disabilities (UNCRPD) with those dominating the EU’s  non-
accession to the Council of Europe Convention on preventing and combating 
violence against women and domestic violence (Istanbul Convention). Based on this 
cross-case analysis,  I argue  that  the EU’s accession decisions are best viewed as 
cost-benefit calculations and explained by the strength of opposition and the desire 
to spread its norms. The EU is only marginally concerned with efforts to construct an 
‘appropriate role’, although its accession considerations are positively influenced by 
(varying degrees) of an internalized commitment to human rights. The paper aims at 
deepening the understanding of the EU’s motivations in the paradigmatic hard case 
of  accession to international human rights treaties  not least to  evaluate  the EU’s 
‘exceptional nature’, facilitate its predictability for stake-holders and contribute to 
political and ethical debates surrounding future rites of passage as a global actor. 
 
 
   Thomas Stiegler 
Introduction: Why join international human rights treaties? 
 
In 2010 the European Union became  the first international organization to 
ratify an international human rights treaty (IHRT), the United Nations Convention on 
the Rights of Persons with Disabilities (UNCRPD), thus entering what has long been a 
states-only domain of international relations.  The  existing  literature offers no 
consensus view on the motivations underlying EU actions in the field of International 
human rights: Evaluations of EU policies oscillate distinctly between characterizations 
as “window dressing”1 and praising depictions as a “poster-child for global human 
rights progress”.2 
If the EU had to write a letter of motivation for its future accessions to IHRTs, 
what reasons would it state? Would the EU make use of a ‘calculator’ of expected 
costs and benefits or rather a ‘mirror’ ascertaining its appropriate role? In assessing 
motivations, this paper seeks to understand and test the sincerity of the EU’s treaty 
commitments 3  to  the promotion of democracy and human rights.  Moreover, 
understanding  which pressures ‘matter’  for its decision-making, will also enable 
empirically grounded political and ethical scrutiny to appraise the EU’s ‘exceptional’ 
nature as a foreign policy actor. Explaining accession to international human rights 
treaties  constitutes a  “paradigmatic hard case”4 to research:  In this international 
treaty, participants are neither rewarded with classical material (economic, security) 
benefits nor can participants be expected to reciprocate a third actor’s violation 
through retaliation against their own population.5  
To answer the question why the EU joins international human rights treaties, this 
paper adopts the following research design: Drawing on the literature, a first section 
will  derive  variables  pertaining to two contrasting  hypotheses. These will then be 
tested in two case studies: the UNCRPD and the Istanbul Convention.6 A third section 
                                                 
1 G. De Búrca, “The Road Not Taken: The EU as a Global Human Rights Actor”, American 
Journal of International Law, vol. 105, 2011, p. 47.  
2 Ibid., p. 3. 
3 See for example: European Union, “Consolidated versions of the Treaty on European Union 
of 30 March 2010” [hereafter TEU], Official Journal of the European Union, C83/01, 2010, art. 
3(1), 3(2), 3(5).  
4 O.A. Hathaway, “Why Do Countries Commit to Human Rights Treaties?”, Journal of Conflict 
Resolution, vol. 51, no. 4 , 2007, p. 589. 
5 A. Geisinger, M. Stein & A. Michael, "Rational Choice, Reputation, and Human Rights 
Treaties", College of William & Mary Law School Paper, no. 666, 2008, p. 1135. 
6 A similar research design was adopted by C. Dingding, “China’s Participation in the 
International Human Rights Regime: A State Identity Perspective”, Chinese Journal of 
International Politics, vol. 2, 2009, p. 400.  EU Diplomacy Papers 1/2013 
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will answer the question based on an analysis of the motivational profile(s) that can 
best explain EU decisions across cases. 
The  first hypothesis explains behavioral  choices through a rational-choice 
theory  framework  assuming that the EU  acts  as  a  “[r]ational, self-interested, utility 
maximizing” actor which is “not interested in other states’ welfare”.7 As such, the EU 
accedes to IHRTs whenever perceived benefits outweigh costs.  
Hypothesis 1: The EU joins IHRTs because it takes an instrumental approach, 
conducts a cost-benefit analysis and accedes if pay-offs outweigh costs. 
By contrast, the second hypothesis focuses on choices made “without, or in 
spite of calculation of consequences and expected utility”.8 It departs from the 
assumption that the EU’s perception of costs and benefits is not fixed but that both 
intrinsic normative beliefs of appropriate behavior  and extrinsic social processes 
(social interactive construction of the appropriate) are superior variables. 
Hypothesis 2: The EU joins IHRTs because it views this step as appropriate. It 
forms this preference by consulting an intrinsic pre-existing commitment or by 
engaging in processes of social interaction in which it is persuaded or driven 
to emulate a reference group.  
Based on the case studies I will argue that the EU’s decisions are informed 
mostly by rational choice variables (strength of opposition and a desire to spread its 
norms), while its actions are to a weaker extent explained by efforts to construct an 
‘appropriate role’. The selected case studies are the United Nations Convention on 
Rights of People with Disabilities, as the first and – so far – the only human rights treaty 
to which the EU has acceded, and the Council of Europe Convention on preventing 
and combating violence against women and domestic violence. This so-called 
Istanbul Convention is substantively comparable to the UNCRPD because it contains 
provisions constituting prominent norms of the EU’s external human rights campaign.9 
Nevertheless, the EU has not acceded to the Istanbul Convention. 
I will infer results as follows: First, the influence of an individual variable is 
labeled positive if evidence and interpretations by interviewees conclude that they 
made an accession decision more likely. Conversely, it is  labeled  negative  if the 
                                                 
7 A.T. Guzman, How International Law Works: A Rational-choice Theory, Oxford, Oxford 
University Press, 2007, p. 17. 
8 J.G. March & J.P. Olsen, “The logic of appropriateness”, in M. Moran, M. Rein & R.E. Goodin 
(eds.), The Oxford Handbook of Public Policy, Oxford, Oxford University Press, 2006, p. 690. 
9 See European Commission, High Representative of the European Union for Foreign Affairs 
and Security Policy, Human rights and democracy at the heart of the EU external action – 
towards a more effective approach, COM(2011) 886 final, Brussels 12 December 2011, p. 8. Thomas Stiegler 
opposite is suggested. The qualification  marginal  is added to indicate a weaker 
strength of influence while neutral denotes little or no impact. 
Second, after evaluating variables and motivational profiles for each 
individual accession decision, I will compare the direction of their influence across 
cases. Variables will be seen as significant for the accession decision, if they are able 
to explain the variation between the EU’s accession (UNCRPD) and non-accession 
decision (Istanbul Convention). The explanatory value regarding this variation will be 
higher, the more a variable’s exerted influence differs across cases, that is, shows a 
variation of influence. 10 The  motivational profile containing the  most  confirmed 
influential variables will thus be seen as the most powerful answer to the question 
why the EU joins IHRTs. As a  first step,  I will  equip  my  hypotheses  with testable 
variables. 
Hypothesis 1: The EU as a rational-choice actor 
The first hypothesis assumes the EU is a rational actor driven exclusively by the 
following fixed benefits and costs: First, at the EU level,11 bureaucratic benefits can 
be  identified.  Through the external tool of IHRT accession  institutional actors  can 
utilize their (supranational) mandate to occupy an internal legislative field, thereby 
expanding their tasks and influence.12 An indicator of significance for this variable is 
an existing  potential to expand tasks and flexibility  on the substance of the 
agreement. 
Second, norm-shaping benefits refer to an interest in the substantive norms of 
a treaty. Norms can be ‘downloaded’ to promote a pre-existing legislative agenda. 
Alternatively,  by  ‘uploading’  own human rights norms,13 the EU can assert  foreign 
policy influence (i.e. shape the global discourse on human rights14) or “creat[e] a 
level playing field internationally”.15 This variable is significant if the EU can influence 
IHRT norms and design through its participation in the treaty making process. For this, 
                                                 
10 For example, political opposition will only be qualified as a significant variable for the EU’s 
general motivations, if its influence in the case of the Istanbul Convention differs from that of 
the case of the UNCRPD. 
11 My analysis focuses exclusively on the EU level leaving aside potential costs and benefits 
that may incur at subordinate levels (individual citizens or individual member states).  
12 V. Aggarwal & E.A. Fogarty, “Explaining Trends in EU Interregionalism”, in V. Aggarwal & E.A. 
Fogarty  (eds.),  European Union Trade Strategies: Between Globalism and Regionalism, 
London, Palgrave, 2004, pp. 207-240. 
13 Ibid. 
14 For the case of China, see E. Wickeri, “China’s Growing Prominence in the Multilateral 
Human Rights System”, HRIC Brief, China Rights Forum, no. 1, 2007, p. 23. 
15 Ibid., p. 613. EU Diplomacy Papers 1/2013 
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it should display active attempts to externally project16 and internally promote the 
treaty’s norms.  
Third,  reputational benefits  could emanate from concerns over the EU’s 
image. As various scholars postulate,17 the EU could be motivated to join an IHRT 
seeking to enhance  external visibility as a new actor and  to showcase a 
consolidated reputation as a norm abider.18 These benefits will be greater, when the 
EU seeks to promote its visibility during negotiations or views accession as beneficial 
for its reputation. Importantly, an improved image is seen as a means to the ends of 
future material benefits rather than as a benefit of social esteem in itself.  
On the flip-side of the equation, accession may incur the following potential 
costs: First, sovereignty costs  can be expected as accession to an IHRT transfers 
competences to an international body which can enforce and monitor human rights 
compliance. These costs are born by both the EU and its member states which are 
obliged to “take all appropriate measures to implement provisions of the mixed 
agreement that fall within the competence of the EU”.19 The sovereignty loss is seen 
as increasingly significant, the more IHRTs stipulate mechanisms for enforcement and 
monitoring. 
Second,  legislative adaptation costs denote  costs incurred  through  internal 
implementation of treaty rules, including through legislative or institutional adapta-
tions. If treaty norms reflect a pre-existing legislative state, these costs are low. They 
rise, however, as the EU undergoes a complex, resource-intensive, internal procedure 
to translate international obligations into community legislation. 
Third, opportunity costs consider that a decision to accede may be commen-
surate with significant opportunity costs requiring commitment of financial resources, 
personnel, time, and expertise, which cannot be used elsewhere.20 An indicator for 
                                                 
16 B. De Witte, “International Law as a Tool for the European Union”, European Constitutional 
Law Review, vol. 265, 2009, p. 278. 
17 See F. Söderbaum, P. Stalgren & L. Van Langenhove, “The EU as a Global Actor and the 
Dynamics of Interregionalism: a Comparative Analysis”, Journal of European Integration, vol. 
27, no. 3, 2005, pp. 365-380; and Aggarwal & Fogarty, op.cit.  
18 O.A. Hathaway, “Between Power and Principle: An Integrated Theory of International Law”, 
University of Chicago Law Review, vol. 71, 2005, p. 510. 
19  European Foundation Centre, “Study on Challenges and Good Practices in the 
Implementation of the UN Convention on the Rights of Persons with Disabilities 
VC/2008/1214”, European Commission Employment, Social Affairs and Equal Opportunities 
DG Unit G3, Brussels, 2010, p. 34. 
20 Guzman, Andrew T., “Formation of Human Rights Treaties, A Response to Alex Geisinger”, 
Opinio Juris, 11 February 2012. Thomas Stiegler 
the salience of this factor is the availability of another policy tool achieving the same 
substantive goals at lower costs. Opportunity costs are higher, the less costly an 
alternative path yielding similar results.  
Fourth,  the  strength of opposition  encapsulates  the notion that  “[w]here 
political pressure opposing treaty commitment exists, governments are less likely to 
join”.  21 Opposition to EU accession to an IHRT may originate from inside the EU 
(member states, institutional actors) or from ‘powerful’ domestic and transnational 
pressure groups. This factor is thus significant if there is evidence of a well-organized, 
powerful interest group or of important member states opposed to accession.22 
Despite spanning a wide field of factors, rational choice theorists conclude 
that the formation of human rights treaties remains “especially difficult to explain”23 
without relaxing the rational choice core assumptions. The following section does so 
by operationalizing my second hypothesis, building a motivational profile consistent 
with a logic of appropriateness.24  
Hypothesis 2: The EU constructs its appropriate role  
The second hypothesis departs from the assumption that costs and benefits 
are not fixed but that internalized norms and social processes determine an 
accession decision.  I will first  examine  whether the EU shows evidence of an 
‘automatic accession reflex’ to IHRTs given an internalized commitment to the “the 
development of international law”25 stipulated in its treaties. Indicative of an EU bias 
for accession is a pre-existing preference for an institution due to a shared history or 
towards a substantive treaty norm. Official justification of accession should resort to 
normative rather than material language while actors should view ‘independent 
external control’ of EU acts as appropriate. 26  
Second,  acculturation  denotes a potential influence of non-state actors 
(private interest groups, civil society) in decision-shaping by acting as a ‘reference 
group’ which the EU follows to confer legitimacy on its action. In case the EU seeks 
                                                 
21 Hathaway, “Between power and principle”, op.cit., p. 103. 
22 Note that the flip side of this variable – positive support from sub-systemic actors – will be 
considered in the socialized areas of the second motivational profile (acculturation and 
persuasion).  
23 O.A. Hathaway, “The Cost of Commitment”, John M. Olin Centre Working Papers, no. 273, 
2003, p. 4. 
24 For a conceptual clarification see March & Olsen, op.cit.  
25 Art. 3(5) TEU, 2nd para. 
26 In this logic independent external control is depicted not as a ‘monitoring cost’ but as a 
positive benefit of accession. EU Diplomacy Papers 1/2013 
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esteem as an end in itself (rather than as a means for future material benefits), an 
acculturation process can  be attested if evidence  reflects  warnings of non-
accession as hurtful for EU esteem and if a reference group is capable of changing 
EU behavior by virtue of allotting esteem or legitimacy.  
Third,  persuasion  dynamics  imply  that the EU changes its preferences by 
becoming convinced that IHRT accession is in its interest. EU preference changes 
must thus be clearly attributable to its engagement in dialogue with effective 
international or domestic pressure groups (advocacy, epistemic) or negotiation 
partners.  
A case of accession: UN Convention on the Rights of People with Disabilities  
 
Adopted in 2006 by the UN General Assembly as the first IHRT of this century, 
the UNCRPD is also the first of its kind dedicated to disability rights, 27 combining both 
the first and the second generation  of human rights 28 through its objective to 
“promote, protect and ensure”29 human rights for the 650 million disabled people in 
the world.30 
The next section  scrutinizes  the EU’s  deliberations  to join this treaty by 
examining its motivations as a rational-choice.  
The EU as a rational-choice actor 
This section assesses  the first motivational profile entailing cost-benefit 
calculations for the EU in acceding to the treaty.  
Bureaucratic benefits 
There is clear evidence that the European Commission garnered benefits from 
EU accession to the UNCRPD. Throughout negotiations, the Commission’s supreme 
interest in signing an international convention was evident in its intense efforts to push 
for the inclusion of a provision authorizing “international organizations to accede to 
                                                 
27 European Foundation Centre, op.cit., p. 34. 
28 M. Schulze, A Handbook on the Human Rights of Persons with Disabilities Understanding The 
UN Convention on the Rights of Persons with Disabilities, New York, Handicap International, 
2010, 3rd edn., p. 34. 
29 See UN General Assembly, Convention on the Rights of Persons with Disabilities: resolution, 
adopted by the General Assembly, A/RES/61/106, 24 January 2007, art. 1.  
30 World Health Organisation, World Report on Disability, Geneva, World Health Organisation, 
2011, p. 29. Thomas Stiegler 
the instrument”.31 The desire for legislative task expansion (‘signing over substance’) is 
epitomized  in agreeing to a rights-based over anti-discrimination approach,  as 
reported  by a closely involved high-level EU official. 32 During negotiations, the 
Commission has been actively taking the lead as the main “position shaper” while no 
member state “spoke out against the Commission”33 which represented the Union. 
As a result of accession the Commission will be a “focal point for the 
implementation of the Convention”,34 while it shares competence for representation 
and coordination.35 Hence, bureaucratic benefits exerted a positive influence on the 
EU’s decision to accede.  
Norm-shaping benefits 
In analyzing the negotiation stage, De Búrca concludes that the EU’s “primary 
strategy” 36 consisted of promoting “the adoption of its own internal model of 
disability discrimination at the international level”.37 In addition, the EU’s ‘European 
Disability Strategy 2010-2020’38 mentions  the Convention ten times,39 underlining its 
utility as an ex-post reference document to justify legislative action.  
Despite  not reaping all conceivable norm-uploading potentials (such as 
uploading the EU  typical institutional design governing the features of the 
Convention40),  the EU still saw  both a foreign policy benefit in uploading and a 
legislative incentive in downloading provisions. This benefit thus played a positive role 
in the EU’s accession considerations.   
                                                 
31 G. De Búrca, “The EU in the Negotiation of the UN Disability Convention”, European Law 
Review, vol. 35, no. 2, 2010, p. 7. 
32 High-level EU official, Delegation of the European Union to the United Nations in Geneva, 
interview, Geneva, 1 May 2012. 
33 De Búrca, “EU Negotiation UNCRPD”, op.cit., p. 8. 
34 Council of the European Union, “Code of Conduct between the Council, the Member 
States and the Commission (2010/C 340/08) setting out internal arrangements for the 
implementation by and representation of the European Union relating to the United Nations 
Convention on the Rights of Persons with Disabilities”, Official Journal of the European Union, 
C340/11, 15 December 2010, p. 11. 
35 Ibid., pp.1-4. 
36 De Búrca, “EU Negotiation UNCRPD”, op.cit., p. 24. 
37 Ibid., p. 1. 
38 European Commission, “European Disability Strategy 2010-2020: A Renewed Commitment 
to a Barrier-Free Europe”, COM (2010) 636 final, Brussels, 15 November 2010. 
39 See ibid., pp. 3-4, 7, 9-10. 
40 Ibid., pp. 16-21. EU Diplomacy Papers 1/2013 
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Reputational benefits  
The EU’s image was able to benefit from a surge in visibility: Negotiation 
accounts suggest that the EU “put a great deal of energy into the promotion of its 
international identity”.41 Obtaining the label of being the ‘historic first’ international 
organization to become “a  party to an international human rights treaty” 42 
appeared to be worth investing diplomatic clout to placate  concerns over an 
undue accrual of voting power43 – and a benefit which at times even outweighed 
the “goal of designing the most effective instrument”. 44 De Búrca ranks the political 
benefit of external visibility as second only to uploading its own disability norms.45  
In sum, concerns to promote the EU’s visibility positively  affected the  EU’s 
accession decision.  
To consider the flip-side of the EU’s balance sheet, the  following section 
examines the UNCRPD’s costs.  
Sovereignty costs 
As a consequence of ratification, the European Union itself now “falls under a 
legal duty” to observe disability standards.46 In addition, the innovative monitoring 
system provides for “independent national monitoring and implementation”47 which 
is secured through the appointment of a focal point that files progress reports and 
serves as a lobbying reference point for NGOs.48 Yet rather than as  ‘costs’, the 
Convention’s legal requirements and external monitoring and control provisions were 
viewed as vital to the EU’s foreign political interest in an “effective” convention.49 
                                                 
41 De Búrca , “EU negotiation UNRPD”, op.cit., p. 23. 
42 “EU ratifies UN Convention on disability rights”, EUROPA, Press Room: Press Releases, 5 
January 2011 
43 High-level EU Official, Geneva, op.cit. 
44 De Búrca, “EU negotiation UNRPD”, op.cit., p. 23. 
45 Ibid., p. 24. According to a high level EU official, this perceived benefit contrasts with a likely 
marginal de facto impact of an accession on EU reputation (visibility and credibility) on the 
global stage, High Level EU Official, Geneva, op.cit. 
46 United Nations Human Rights, Office of the High Commissioner, “The European Union and 
International Human Rights Law”, Brussels, United Nations Brussels, 2008, p. 49. 
47 De Búrca , “EU negotiation UNCRPD”, op.cit., p.12. 
48 See United Nations General Assembly, Convention on the Rights of Persons with Disabilities: 
resolution A/RES/61/106, New York, art. 33 and art. 35.  
49 European Union, “Comprehensive and integral international convention to promote and 
protect the rights and dignity of persons with disabilities-  Position paper by the European 
Union”, Position Paper for the Ad Hoc Committee on a Compressive and Integral 
International Convention on Protection and Promotion of the Rights and Dignity of Persons 
with Disabilities (A/AC.265/WP.2), New York, United Nations Enable, 2002. Thomas Stiegler 
Sovereignty concerns initially  voiced by some member  states over an 
“interference with their domestic educational system”  lost significance over the 
course of negotiations and failed to derail the EU’s eventual accession. 50 
Nevertheless, sovereignty concerns are evident in that despite calls by the European 
Parliament and a proposal by the Commission,51 the Council to date has not ratified 
the optional protocol of the UNCRPD which would oblige the Union to accept 
submission of private complaints to independent committees.52  
Overall, as important sovereignty costs (such as independent monitoring and 
obligations under international law) were interpreted as benefits while others exerted 
some negative impact (such as private complaints and member state concerns over 
their national education competence), the overall influence of sovereignty costs on 
the EU’s accession deliberations can be assessed as marginally negative.  
Legislative adaptation costs 
The Commission reportedly pursued a deliberate strategy “to avoid the need 
for internal adaptation”,53 thus preempting any “cost of adjusting to a new legal 
framework”.54 As a result, the UNCRPD in large parts does not go beyond the level of 
provisions already existing at the national level.55 Triggering specific efforts to their 
avoidance, potentially high legislative adaptation costs are interpreted as exerting a 
negative influence on the EU considerations.  
Opportunity costs  
Widely thought to be ‘expensive and bureaucratic’, the intricacies of the UN 
institutional apparatus  did  not significantly alter the EU’s willingness to continue 
negotiations nor did it prevent EU attempts for an arguably cost-intensive innovative 
monitoring system as the Commission pledged avoiding “undue administrative 
                                                 
50 De Búrca , “The EU in the Negotiation of the UN Disability Convention”, op.cit., p. 9. 
51 European Parliament, Committee on Employment and Social Affairs, Rumiana Jeleva 
(rapporteur), Report on the proposal for a Council decision concerning the conclusion, by 
the European Community, of the Optional Protocol to the United Nations Convention on the 
Rights of Persons with disabilities, 2008/0171(NLE), Brussels, 3 April 2009, p. 7. 
52 “Disability Rights: EU and the Ratification of the UN Convention on the Rights of Persons with 
Disabilities”, EUROPA, Press Room: Press Releases, 18 May 2010.  
53 De Búrca, “The EU in the Negotiation of the UN Disability Convention”, op.cit., p. 22. 
54 Ibid., p. 9, no. 27. 
55 “Disability Rights: EU and the Ratification”, op.cit. EU Diplomacy Papers 1/2013 
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burden to facilitate  [its]  implementation”. 56 Moreover, no other international or 
national instrument was available to justify an internal legislative initiative.  
Correspondingly, the treaty’s opportunity costs are interpreted  as rather 
neutral for the EU’s accession considerations.   
Strength of political opposition  
Considering the treaty’s ratification record,  all  27 EU member  states  have 
signed the Convention of which to this date  20  have ratified it,  16  of which also 
acceded to the optional protocol (19 signed).57 Reportedly, political disagreements 
in judging the necessity  for  or scope  of  a convention (Netherlands, Austria and 
Ireland  vs.  UK 58 )  were  primarily responsible for weakening the  EU’s  influence, 
particularly  the  efforts to introduce innovative monitoring mechanisms.59 However, 
the Commission and the Belgian Council Presidency  devised instruments to rally 
member state support. They exerted political pressure by stating that swift conclusion 
by all member states “will send a strong signal" to the world.60 Low levels of political 
opposition  regarding the overall question of accession thus constituted a  neutral 
factor in the EU’s decision to accede.  
For its decision to join the UNCRPD, an analysis of rational choice variables has 
thus found  strong  influence of legislative adaptation costs  (negative)  and 
bureaucratic and norm-shaping benefits (positive). 
The next section will change the perspective from fixed costs and benefits to 
consider whether the EU’s accession decision can better be understood as an effort 
to respond to intrinsic beliefs and social pressures to construct an appropriate role. 
The EU’s construction of an appropriate role 
This section evaluates the second motivational profile for the EU to accede to 
the UNCRPD, the effort to construct an appropriate role.  
   
                                                 
56 European Commission, “European Disability Strategy 2010-2020”, op.cit., p.11. 
57 United Nations Enable, “Convention and Optional Protocol Signatures and Ratifications: 
Countries and Regional Integration Organizations”, United Nations, New York, 2013. 
58 De Búrca , “EU negotiation UNCRPD”, op.cit., p. 9. 
59 Ibid. 
60 Human Rights Watch, “EU: Way Cleared to Join Human Rights Treaty”, New York, 6 
December 2010. Thomas Stiegler 
Internalization 
Contrary to an ‘automatic accession reflex’, the EU prioritized an “effective” 
treaty as a precondition for accession.61 The importance of ‘progress in substance’ 
suggests a  technical  rationale  trumping the effect of any  pre-existing institutional 
commitment to the United Nations.  
Nevertheless, the EU ideationally justified its stances as it believed its “model to 
be the best available”.62 Strong advocacy for independent monitoring evidently also 
subjects the Union itself to external control. 63  The EU displayed a degree of 
internalized commitment to the relevance and effectiveness of international law 
which  it  did not weigh against material costs but considered  ‘appropriate’.  An 
‘other-regarding’ interest64 directed at the well-being of (disabled) citizens in other 
states also figures in EU rhetoric as then Commissioner for External Relations Ferrero-
Waldner declared that EU accession reflected EU “efforts to protect and promote 
the rights of persons with disabilities worldwide”.65 
Hence,  the  professed  internalization of the Convention  norms by EU actors 
exerted a positive influence on the EU’s decision to accede.   
Persuasion  
Were persuasive dynamics inducing the EU to accede to the Convention? 
After “a decade of more general lobbying from interested groups and  actors” 
Mexico rather than the EU was the main promoter of the UNCRPD.66 The EU’s initially 
reserved negotiation position  transformed into support for accession “once it 
became clear that a consensus in favour of a binding international treaty was 
emerging”.67 Opportunistic calculations thus prevailed over outside pressure groups 
shaping the EU’s position. Similarly, the EU was not persuaded that a development-
                                                 
61 Council of the European Union, “Council Decision of 26 November 2009 concerning the 
conclusion, by the European Community, of the United Nations Convention on the Rights of 
Persons with Disabilities, by the European Community”, Official Journal of the European Union, 
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based approach was in fact superior to a rights-based approach. It accepted the 
majority view when it realised that its position for a discrimination-based instrument 
failed to win sufficient support.68 
Due to a  rather autonomous EU decision-making  process  during which 
interactions were confined to internal coordination between member states and the 
Commission,  the effect of  persuasive attempts by external actors on the EU 
accession deliberations is interpreted to be merely marginally positive.  
Acculturation  
Rather than following a “script”69 of appropriate behavior by states or NGOs, 
the evidence suggests that the EU’s “win-set” 70 was rather unaffected by the 
legitimacy of other actors: Observers stated that the EU “found strong allies” in NGOs 
using their “expertise and experience” suggesting an instrumental use of NGOs rather 
than a  substantive or ideational dependence.71 While  high-level post-negotiation 
meetings are to ensure compliance with the UNCRPD, they are framed as NGOs 
“being taken seriously”,72 suggesting an inverse legitimizing mechanism to the one 
underlying the acculturation factor.  
Thus, despite significant presence and attested strength of potential 
advocacy and reference groups, the  state-  or civil society-driven process of 
acculturation can only be assigned a neutral influence on the EU’s motivations for 
joining the UNCRPD.  
The analysis of the  second motivational profile  thus  suggests  that  to an 
important degree the EU’s considerations were shaped by pre-existing preferences 
for the institutional structures and substantive provisions of the UNCRPD with social 
factors of persuasion and acculturation adding positive impulses only at the margins.  
                                                 
68 Ibid. 
69 For an explanation of the concept of a ‘global script’, see R. Goodman & D. Jinks, 
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of International Law, vol. 19, no. 4, 2008, p. 727, no. 55. 
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A case of non-accession: The Istanbul Convention  
The second case study sheds light on a treaty to which the EU has to date not 
acceded although legal hurdles have been cleared. The Istanbul Convention aims 
at “protecting the victims and persecute the perpetrators” of violence against 
women. 73  The treaty constitutes the most specific and comprehensive treaty 
worldwide designed to counteract gender-based violence through legally binding 
provisions.  The  analysis begins with rational-choice considerations of the EU’s 
accession considerations. 
The EU as a rational-choice actor 
This section assesses  the first motivational profile  regarding the  cost-benefit 
calculations for the EU’s (non-)accession to the Istanbul Convention. 
Bureaucratic benefits  
As was the case for the UNCRPD, EU accession could enable the Commission 
to exercise its rights of ‘occupying’ the legislative field of domestic violence internally 
on the basis of international commitments.  Unlike in the UNCRPD,  however,  the 
Commission has not actively pushed for an accession: Why then are these potential 
benefits not reaped? In its only (publicly) available statement, Commissioner Reding 
declares that “[a]n eventual accession to the Convention […]  by  the  EU  would 
require a careful analysis of all its implications”.74 Moreover, Commissioner Reding is 
quoted asserting that accession did not meet her resistance.75 However, damping 
the optimism, a personal interview with a closely involved administrator suggests that 
fearing  political  resistance  by member  states  to EU accession,  a  majority of 
Commissioners prefers not to pursue ‘occupying’ this field. This reluctance – viewed 
by some observers as evidence for a lack of “bureaucratic courage”76 – stands in 
stark contrast to EEAS rhetoric which lists the “launch [of] a number of campaigns 
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associated with the Violence Against Women guidelines” among the EU’s first human 
rights priorities.77  
An opportunity to gain bureaucratic benefits thus exerts a marginally positive 
influence on EU actors’ decision to join IHRTs. 
Reputational benefits  
Visibility gains of accession would tend to be weaker than in the case of the 
UNCRPD as accession would not be a “historically first” treaty for the EU to sign and 
the EU’s audience would be less global in scope. However, a large potential benefit 
could lie in boosting EU credibility since accession and compliance would remedy 
an incoherence (noticed by observers78 and diplomats79) between the EU criticizing 
third countries for their lack of “international commitments” 80 and its reluctance of 
entering into an available instrument itself.  While professing to fix its record on 
“fighting […] discrimination based on […] gender”81 the EU does not anticipate a 
heightened concern for reputational damage or benefits from accession to the 
Istanbul Convention.  
Therefore,  the impact of reputational benefits on the EU’s accession 
considerations is only marginally positive.  
Norm-shaping benefits 
Having been formally excluded from the treaty-making process of the Istanbul 
Convention,82 an accession would not enable the EU to upload its norms in pursuit of 
a foreign policy agenda. Rather accession would result in the inverse process of 
                                                 
77 European External Action Service, “Interview with Mrs Riina Kionka, Head of Division ‘Human 
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‘downloading’ norms of a ‘pre-cooked’  convention text which may differ 
significantly from its own  policy preferences. Moreover,  in light of a lack of 
agreement on introducing legislation on violence against women  internally, a 
potential to shape  norms  internationally is  not  viewed  as a feasible benefit.  The 
possibility of norm-shaping benefits is consequently exerting a neutral influence on 
the EU’s accession considerations.  
Sovereignty costs 
 Besides  the  lack  of an  enforcement regime, the Istanbul Convention’s 
independent monitoring and review procedures by an expert body are comparable 
to those of the UNCRPD. 83  They thus entail  potential  negative  collateral 
consequences  for  EU sovereignty.  Substantively,  however,  gender relations are 
perceived as a socially sensitive area in  which states have traditionally objected 
interference by international commitments.84 Moreover, within the “current climate”, 
member states’ concerns over sovereignty abdication are more pronounced.85 The 
degree of delegation of competences and independent external control is  not 
considerably higher compared to the UNCRPD.  
However, due to member state  sensitivity,  political opposition exerts a 
negative influence on the EU decision.   
Opportunity costs  
In terms of other available tools for the EU, evidence suggests indeed that the 
EU can achieve the goals of the Istanbul Convention through existing instruments 
posing lower costs than outright accession. By providing in its Council Roadmap that 
“the Union should especially take into account the standards set out in” the Istanbul 
Convention, the EU can claim to honor a political commitment to women’s rights 
while avoiding the cost of full accession.86 Despite this opportunity, the Commission 
does seem to view some distinguishing benefits in the Council of Europe Convention 
inducing it to consider accession.  
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The availability of other instruments thus has marginally negative influence on 
the EU’s considerations.  
Legislative adaptation costs  
The implementation of the Istanbul Convention would result in few new 
commitments for the European Union compared to what is already entailed in its 
internal DAPHNE program.87 However, adaptations at the member state level would 
likely be considerable as many member states lack provisions on violence against 
women. Surveys conclude that “[t]he need for harmonized legal standards to ensure 
that victims benefit from the same level of protection everywhere in Europe was […] 
apparent”. 88  While marginal at the EU level, recognizably significant national 
adaptation costs exert a negative influence on the overall EU decision to accede.  
Strength of political opposition  
Contrary to the UNCRPD, the Istanbul Convention constitutes “a particularly 
divisive issue” for EU actors.89 The lack of enthusiasm, particularly at the member state 
level,  is exemplified by the fact that only one Council of Europe  member  state 
(Turkey)  has ratified, and 17  EU  member  states  have  signed the Convention.90 In 
addition, “[m]any states already made declarations stating that they would not use 
the Convention including Russia, Bulgaria and others”. 91 The overt and explicit 
rejection by these member states appears to be a matter of principle rather than 
political strategy.  
Thus, a resistance at the member state level,92 which was reinforced by a well-
organized civil society campaign against making violence against women a more 
public issue, 93  showed its effect: The Commission  has so far failed to seize 
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opportunities to exert political pressure to encourage accession –  a remarkable 
contrast to its behavior during the  negotiations  of the UNCPRD.  Posing  significant 
costs for institutional actors, the influence of political opposition to the EU’s accession 
to the Istanbul Convention is thus negative. 
Overall,  the EU’s decisional equation for the Istanbul Convention looks 
markedly different from the UNCRPD: Besides opportunity costs, all other identified 
costs categories were confirmed as negative.  Moreover, the EU’s lack of 
involvement in the negotiations leading up to its formation neutralized bureaucratic 
and norm-shaping benefits.  
To what extent is the EU’s position informed by a desire to construct  an 
appropriate role? The following section will examine  the  explanatory  power  of 
intrinsic and social considerations.  
The EU’s construction of an appropriate role 
This section evaluates  again  the  EU’s  second motivational profile, this time 
regarding the Istanbul Convention.  
Internalization 
While on paper combating violence against women is firmly anchored in 
Commission guidelines, 94  in  the DAPHNE program 95  as well as  in  the external 
programs funded by the EIDHR,96 heterogeneous degrees of internalization can be 
detected both at the EU  and the member  state level. 97 While the competent 
Commissioner appears to display a strong commitment, neither the College of 
Commissioners nor member states seem to share a sense of urgency for accession.98 
The member states’ reluctance appears to be rooted in deeper-running cultural and 
religious views on the need for legal instruments to better protect women’s rights.99 
By the same token, a shared founding history between the EU and the Council of 
                                                 
94 European Union, “Human Rights Guidelines –  Violence against women and girls and 
combating all forms of discrimination against them”, op.cit. 
95 See European Parliament, Council of the European Union, “Decision (No. 779/2007 /EC)”, 
op.cit. 
96 European Union, EU Annual Report on Human Rights and Democracy in the World 2010, 
op.cit., p. 37. 
97 Heterogeneous levels of internalization were confirmed by R. Youngs, Director General 
FRIDE, interview, Bruges, 26 April 2012. 
98 Linden Jonsten, op.cit. 
99 Ibid. It is suggested that a rights-based approach is strongly anchored in certain member 
states (e.g. Scandinavia) and missing in others (e.g. Balkan states). EU Diplomacy Papers 1/2013 
 
21 
Europe falls short of building a pre-existing EU bias for accession nor does it induce 
the EU to “exert friendly pressure” to promote Council of Europe IHRTs.100   
Similarly to the UNCRPD, internalization is thus significantly embedded in the 
normative fabric and action of the EU’s supranational structures but due to its 
heterogeneous distribution among member states,  it possesses merely  marginally 
positive influence on accession considerations.  
Acculturation  
Could  the  EU’s  non-accession  thus be viewed as the result of a missing 
reference group or of a lacking desire for social esteem? First, the Council of Europe 
as an institution could be seen as a reference group for the EU. While an EEAS official 
confirmed that there is general appreciation101 and cross-fertilization with the Council 
of Europe  at the parliamentary level,102 the absence of  an  overall salience and 
visibility of the Convention weakens the Council of Europe’s capacity to act as a role 
model or reference group for the EU.103 Nevertheless, the fact that IHRTs are cited in 
legislative acts and debated within the EU  institutions  provides  evidence of the 
Council of Europe exerting a marginal “external source of pressure on the EU”.104  
Second, on the side of civil society, the European Women’s lobby has 
advocated strongly for Council conclusions to devise an EU strategy to end violence 
against women but ranks EU accession to the Istanbul Convention only third on a list 
of priorities.105 Unable to compensate for weak institutional support, this group is also 
suffering from a collective action problem being  “loosely  organized and poorly 
resourced”.106 
Due to the absence of esteem-inducing external pressure on the EU, non- 
accession is not accompanied by social sanctions or the promise of palpable social 
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esteem benefits. Hence, acculturation is again  interpreted  to exert  a  neutral 
influence vis-à-vis the EU’s accession considerations. 
Persuasion  
As EU representatives did not participate in the drafting and framing of the 
Istanbul Convention  persuasion  dynamics  could not occur during negotiations. 
Given the lack of domestic pressure groups actively lobbying  for EU accession, 
alternative modes of persuasion of EU actors remain ineffective for structural reasons.   
First,  persuasive pressures by political  groups 107  and  by  the European 
Parliament108 have not visibly resulted in more intense dialogues or negotiations for 
accession. The HR/VP’s statement to be “very pleased to see that so many people 
mentioned the issues of women’s rights” 109  suggests  that her commitment to 
women’s rights preceded and therefore did not require any persuasive engagement 
with the report.  
Second, however,  there are signs  that  a more pro-active Commission is 
reaching out to parliamentary interlocutors to help facilitate dialogue on accession, 
suggesting that processes of persuasion are indeed currently at work generating the 
“possibility”110 of a change of heart on this issue. In the words of a high-level policy 
advisor: “The fight will likely continue.” 111  Weak  persuasion dynamics are thus 
observed to exert a marginally positive influence on EU deliberations. 
A  central  factor  for the construction of an appropriate role is the strong 
variation in the degree of internalization of the treaty’s substantive norms. Taking a 
bird’s eye perspective on this factor, one could derive evidence of a broader 
problem of the Convention being stripped off an essential requirement of 
effectiveness, namely a “high degree of consensus values among European 
societies”112 in the substantive field of combating violence against women. Pressure 
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groups attempting to remedy this condition are weak as current persuasion efforts 
face an uphill battle.  
Mirror or calculator: what explains EU accession to IHRTs?  
 
The results of the  cross-case comparison are summed up  in  Table  1 which 
shows the direction of influence of the variables for both treaties. The last column 
highlights the potential of variables to explain why the EU acceded to the UNCRPD 
but did not accede to the Istanbul Convention: A variable’s potential to explain this 
variation will be stronger, the more a variable’s influence differs across the cases.113 
The explanatory strength of variables is classified as weak (a minus sign), moderate 
(one plus sign) or strong (two plus signs). 
Table 1: Summary of results of cross-case analysis: direction of influence 
Hypothesis  Variable 
Accession to 
UNCRPD 
 
Non-
Accession to 
Istanbul 
Convention 
 
Comparative 
explanatory 
power 
regarding 
variation  
 
 
 
 
 
 
Logic of 
Consequentialism 
 
Sovereignty costs  Marginally 
negative 
Negative 
+ 
Legislative adaptation costs  Negative  Negative 
- 
Strength of political opposition  Neutral  Negative 
++ 
Opportunity costs  Neutral  Marginally 
negative 
+ 
Bureaucratic benefits  Positive  Marginally 
positive 
+ 
Reputational benefits  Positive  Marginally 
positive 
+ 
Norm-shaping benefits  Positive  Neutral 
++ 
Logic of 
Appropriateness 
 
Internalization  Positive  Marginally 
positive 
+ 
Acculturation  Neutral  Neutral 
- 
Persuasion  Marginally 
positive 
Marginally 
positive 
- 
 
Within the rational-choice  framework, all factors (except for legislative 
adaptation costs) showed a variation in the influence on the EU’s decision across 
cases. Of these factors, however, the analysis found the strongest variation in the 
                                                 
113  To illustrate, exerting negative  influence in both cases, the existence of legislative 
adaptation costs cannot explain the different accession decisions. By contrast, a neutral 
political pressure allowed accession while strongly negative political pressure prompted non-
accession. Therefore political opposition can explain why the EU joins International human 
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strength of political opposition and norm-shaping benefits. In other words, one can 
plausibly infer that their variation correlates with the EU’s behavior regarding both 
conventions.  
Within  the  motivational profile  based on the logic of appropriateness  only 
varying degrees of internalization  may explain the EU’s non-accession, since 
acculturation and persuasion dynamics had a weak influence in both cases. The 
lack  of  cultural and political consensus  within the EU regarding an urgency 
perceived for disability as opposed to women’s rights is suggested to be a core 
element of explaining the variation in the EU’s accession decisions. However, 
internalization at the  EU level is not a sufficient condition for accession: An 
internalized norm of combating violence against women fails to induce  EU 
institutional actors to  ask  its member  states to ratify the Istanbul Convention.  This 
evidence supports the conclusion that norm internalization must be evident at both 
the EU and the member state level to exert a strong influence in favor of 
accession.114 
Why  then does the EU join international human rights treaties? A  rather 
nuanced picture emerges from the case studies, suggesting two conclusions: First, 
since the EU acceded  when  the (accumulated) positive influence of  benefits 
outweighed the negative influence of costs and did not accede when this relation 
was reversed, hypothesis 1 can be confirmed. An overall glance at the influence of 
rational-choice variables suggests that the EU does indeed conduct a cost-benefit 
analysis when deciding whether to join an  IHRT. Factors pertaining to the first 
motivational profile emerged as significant for the EU’s accession considerations 
across both cases. Therefore, an overall interpretation of the results tentatively 
suggests that the EU’s motivation for accession was rather instrumental-materialistic 
than intrinsic-socialized in nature. The very fact that the internalization of human 
rights norms varies across member states prevents the EU from acting consistently in 
an  ‘altruistic’  cosmopolitan fashion. Even in the  case of the UNCRPD,  where 
internalized norms are visible, the EU does not display an automatic accession reflex. 
Second, due to the importance of internalization as a  necessary but not 
sufficient factor motivating EU action, hypothesis 2 can be partially confirmed. Even 
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in the absence of significant persuasion or acculturation dynamics, it is difficult to 
derive from the findings that EU behavior is not also amenable to factors pertaining 
to the logic of appropriateness. The internalization of human rights norms is a basic 
prerequisite for the EU to even consider joining an IHRT. Reverting to the cardinal 
distinction between  a “myopic […]  and farsighted self-interest”,115 EU motivations 
can be qualified as trending towards the first in the Istanbul Convention and the 
second in the UNCRPD. While a methodologically constructed dichotomy of profiles 
is thus empirically dissolved into a synthesis, the result of this case study informs more 
general insights into EU motivations.  
Conclusion: Cost-benefit calculations rather than approporiateness 
 
This paper examined why the European Union joins international human rights 
treaties. It has been argued that the EU’s accession decisions are based on cost-
benefit calculations that can be explained by the strength of opposition and the 
desire to spread its norms rather than by efforts to construct an ‘appropriate role’. 
Not unlike traditional  actors in International Relations, both  “calculated 
expected utility” as well as “internalized  rules and principles” 116 shape the EU’s 
accession decisions. Yet the analysis revealed a partly exceptional nature of the EU’s 
motivations: In general, instrumental and rather self-interested calculations geared at 
its  internal environment were at the heart of the EU’s  considerations.  A  rather 
autonomous bureaucratic interest of its supranational institutional actors (especially 
the Commission)  generates  sui generis  costs and benefits (e.g.  uploading and 
downloading of norms) producing idiosyncratic rationales. Rather than an altruistic 
cosmopolitan actor who shows an automatic accession reflex, my  analysis has 
portrayed EU action as acting  strategically  on the basis of at times ambiguous 
degrees of internalization. States and institutions can thus only partially view the EU as 
a ‘fellow peer’. 
Furthermore,  it can be  observed  that internal considerations (notably 
legislative adaptation and sovereignty costs) weigh slightly stronger on the EU’s 
decision than foreign policy considerations. The latter are confined to a ‘preference 
to be seen’ trumping a ‘preference for esteem’ logic. One could argue that as a 
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nascent external actor in the business of ‘diplomatic branding’, the EU is vulnerable 
to a trade-off between external visibility and principled negotiation accomplish-
ments. Besides, heterogeneous levels of human rights internalization cause an 
internal lack of credibility which would require bureaucratic courage to confront.  
In both cases, EU decision making appeared relatively unaffected by pressure 
from outside groups. However, the EU’s high regard for norm-shaping benefits should 
command  advocacy groups to push for formal inclusion of the EU in  the treaty 
negotiation stage. Moreover, I find that accession to an IHRT can have the function 
of serving as a tool for the Commission to exert internal political pressure on member 
states to change preferences,  promoting universal acceptance of human rights 
where they are not fully internalized.  
Beyond the insights won from the case studies, the question of accession to 
IHRTs promises to remain alive: A high-level EU official mentioned possible EU efforts to 
accede to the Convention on the Elimination of all Forms of Discrimination against 
Women (CEDAW) and to the International Convention on the Elimination of all Forms 
of Racial Discrimination (CERD) via a “political protocol” authorizing such a move.117 
These prospects suggest abandoning a legal filter to include those treaties whose 
formal hurdles for EU participation have not been cleared. An interview confirmed 
that external pressure 118 to accede to the United Nations Convention on the 
Protection of the Rights of all Migrant Workers and Members of their Families (ICRMW) 
show little sign of changing its internally motivated preference for non-accession.119   
To fruitfully explore EU motivations regarding new treaties, it is recommended 
to develop the research design further: First, a review and refinement of variables 
could aim to address the difficulty of devising exact measurement or  calculating 
more exact degrees of influence. Second, new case studies could test the validity 
and interplay of variables. They could also study dynamics between the member 
state  and  the  EU level.  As future world powers are held accountable for their 
treatment of international law and human rights, 120  devising  “appropriate 
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comparators” 121 will  allow  comparing  EU motivations with those of other global 
actors. This could set empirically grounded answers against short-circuited inferences 
from behavior. Third, while a legal line of research may fruitfully debate whether the 
EU accessions constitute “milestone(s) in the history of human rights”,122 this paper 
sought to elucidate  the question of EU motivations towards IHRTs. Further 
motivational inquiries could complement  ethical and political debates  over  the 
quality of EU actions.  
Finally, returning to the initial image of the EU as an applicant to (future) IHRTs, 
what have we learned about its fictional ‘letter of motivation’? The findings suggest 
that, as a sincere applicant, the EU cannot simply submit a photocopy of official 
commitments. Rather, aided by a calculator and occasional glances in the mirror, 
the EU’s letter may feature three subparagraphs which read in ascending order of 
dedicated space: ‘competences’, ‘convictions’ and ‘calculations’.  
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